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Part XII of the United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea and 
the Duty to Mitigate Against Climate 
Change: Making Out a Claim, 
Causation, and Related Issues 
Seokwoo Lee* and Lowell Bautista** 
 Within the current state of international jurisprudence, there is a growing 
recognition of the importance of ocean environmental protection. One of the 
most significant recent examples is the decision in the South China Sea 
Arbitration, which recognized the obligation of States to protect and preserve 
the marine environment in disputed territorial or maritime areas. Despite this 
overall trend, however, serious gaps in State practice remain. In particular, 
current research on State practice of national and regional marine pollution 
contingency planning in the Asia-Pacific reveals that there has been little regard 
displayed in the region for accommodating a proactive approach to marine 
environmental protection. 
The international community, particularly the States that are suffering the 
consequences of climate change and sea-level rise, is attempting to tackle the 
problem of climate change and to find ways to mitigate its damages. One 
suggestion has been to bring a legal claim before an international tribunal to 
commence climate change litigation. From the perspective of the current regime 
of international law, including the Law of the Sea and State responsibility, the 
feasibility and effectiveness of climate change litigation is highly questionable. 
This is largely due to the challenges of establishing causation and other related 
issues. 
An alternative suggestion is to use the legal mechanism of the United 
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, not to adjudicate the issue, but to seek 
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the issuance of an advisory opinion on the legal question presented by climate 
change in light of international agreements related to the purposes of this 
Convention. The problem with such an advisory opinion, however, would be its 
potential for ineffectiveness due to its non-binding character. 
In conclusion, there is no single solution to resolve the issue of climate 
change. However, a better understanding of the linkages between Parties’ 
obligations under relevant treaties such as the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change, the Paris Agreement, and the United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea, among others, may provide an additional 
impetus for States to take climate change seriously and increase efforts to 
negotiate additional agreements and implement them effectively. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Climate change is a problem that transcends State boundaries and one that 
raises intergenerational concerns as well as contentious issues of equity between 
developed and developing nations.1 The unique nature of climate change requires 
that international efforts to address its impacts and challenges recognize the 
principle of common but differentiated responsibilities,2 and that they be mindful 
of the social and economic goals of developing countries.3 
Most contemporary international environmental treaties and the broader 
international climate change legal framework have successfully managed to 
incorporate progressive ideals that underscore interstate social and distributive 
justice provisions.4 However, effective enforcement and compliance with 
 
 1.  Daniel Bodansky, The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change: A 
Commentary, 18 YALE J. INT’L L. 451, 498 (1993); see also EDITH BROWN WEISS, IN FAIRNESS TO 
FUTURE GENERATIONS: INTERNATIONAL LAW, COMMON PATRIMONY, AND INTERGENERATIONAL 
EQUITY 10–11 (1989); Upendra Baxi, Towards a Climate Change Justice Theory?, 7 J. HUM. RTS. & 
ENV’T 7, 26 (2016) (arguing that the notion of intergenerational justice is crucial to the discourse on 
climate justice theory); Elizabeth Burleson, Climate Change Consensus: Emerging International Law, 34 
WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 543, 549–553 (2010) (recounting the disagreement between 
African developing nations and developed nations during the Copenhagen negotiations). 
 2.  United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change pmbl., art. 3, ¶ 1, art. 4, adopted 
May 9, 1992, 1771 U.N.T.S. 107 [hereinafter UNFCCC] (entered into force Mar. 21, 1994). The concept 
of Common but Differentiated Responsibilities (CBDR) was enshrined as Principle 7 of the Rio 
Declaration at the first Rio Earth Summit in 1992. U.N. Conference on Environment and Development, 
Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, princ. 7, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151/26/Rev.1 (Vol. I), 
annex I (Aug. 12 1992) (“In view of the different contributions to global environmental degradation, States 
have common but differentiated responsibilities.”); see also Paris Agreement art. 2, opened for signature 
Apr. 22, 2016, T.I.A.S. 16-1104 (entered into force Nov. 4, 2016) (stating that the Agreement “will be 
implemented to reflect equity and the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities and 
respective capabilities, in the light of different national circumstances”). 
 3.  Brooke Ackerly & Michael P. Vandenbergh, Climate Change Justice: The Challenge for 
Global Governance, 20 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 553, 555 (2008); Marie-Claire Cordonier Segger, 
Advancing the Paris Agreement on Climate Change for Sustainable Development, 5 CAMBRIDGE J. INT’L 
& COMP. L. 202, 210, 222 (2016); Tuiloma Neroni Slade, Climate Change: The Human Rights 
Implications for Small Island Developing States, 37 ENVTL. POL’Y & L. 215, 216 (2007). 
 4.  Mark Stallworthy, Environmental Justice Imperatives for an Era of Climate Change, 36 J.L. & 
SOC’Y 55, 62 (2009); Lavanya Rajamani, The Increasing Currency and Relevance of Rights-Based 
Perspectives in the International Negotiations on Climate Change, 22 J. ENVTL. L. 391, 395–97 (2010); 
see also Jessie Hohmann, Igloo as Icon: A Human Rights Approach to Climate Change for the Inuit?, 18 
TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 295, 297‒98 (2009) (describing the use of human rights to address 
climate change impacts); Sarah Krakoff, American Indians, Climate Change, and Ethics for a Warming 
World, 85 DENV. U. L. REV. 865, 891‒95 (2008) (noting the shift in addressing climate change to include 
addressing poverty and inequality); Karen E. MacDonald, A Right to a Healthful Environment ‒ Humans 
and Habitats: Re-Thinking Rights in an Age of Climate Change, 17 EUR. ENERGY & ENVTL. L. REV. 213, 
214‒15, 223 (2008). 
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international environmental instruments remain difficult and politically complex 
issues.5 
The existing literature on climate change, justice, and all related treaties, 
recognizes both the unequal contributions by States in causing climate change 
and the disparate abilities of States to address it.6 Developing nations, especially 
the least-developed countries and developing small-island nations, that 
minimally contribute to the problem of climate change, are the most vulnerable 
with the least capacity to adapt to climate change.7 The disparity between 
developed and developing nations is a very divisive issue that further complicates 
the already-complex international negotiations on climate change. 
The international legal framework regarding States’ differing legal 
responsibilities for climate change damage is still in its nascent stages of 
development.8 In particular, the intersection of international environmental 
instruments relating to climate change and the protection of the international 
marine environment has not yet been fully explored.9 Despite the inadequacies 
of existing international law, it is not hard to envision a future scenario where 
interstate litigation involving transboundary damage caused by climate change 
will be possible.10 
This Article will examine Part XII of the United Nations Convention on the 
Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), which relates to the protection and preservation of 
 
 5.  See Ailsa Ceri Warnock, The Climate Change Regime: Efficacy, Compliance and Enforcement, 
8 N.Z. J. ENVTL. L. 99, 104–16, 131–35 (2004) (discussing the efficacy of compliance mechanisms 
contained within the UNFCC and the Kyoto Protocol). 
 6.  See, e.g., Sumudu Atapattu, Climate Change, International Environmental Law Principles, and 
the North-South Divide, 26 TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 247, 252 (2017). 
 7.  Paris Agreement, supra note 2, at art. 11; Ved P. Nanda, Climate Change and Developing 
Countries: The International Law Perspective, 16 ILSA J. INT’L & COMP. L. 539, 543 (2010). 
 8.  See Benoit Mayer, State Responsibility and Climate Change Governance: A Light Through the 
Storm, 13 CHINESE J. INT’L L. 539, 546 (2014) (noting that the concept of “common but differentiated 
responsibilities” in protecting the climate system to this day remains ambiguous and has created 
“fundamentally divergent conceptions of international co-operation on climate change”); Christina Voigt, 
State Responsibility for Climate Change Damages, 77 NORDIC J. INT’L L. 1, 2 (2008) (citing “[v]ague 
primary rules” as one obstacle to determining State responsibility); see also Phillip Barton, State 
Responsibility and Climate Change: Could Canada Be Liable to Small Island States?, 11 DALHOUSIE J. 
LEGAL STUD. 65, 87 (2002) (arguing that the likelihood of success of a state liability claim based on harms 
from climate change impacts would require a “tremendous leap” in international law). 
 9.  Karen N. Scott, International Environmental Governance: Managing Fragmentation Through 
Institutional Connection, 12 MELB. J. INT’L L. 177, 185 (2011); see also Secretariats of the Convention 
on Biological Diversity, the United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification, and the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change, Options for Enhanced Cooperation Among the Three Rio 
Conventions, U.N. Doc. FCCC/SBSTA/2004/INF.19, annex (Nov. 2, 2004) (calling on each of the 
Conferences of the Parties to the Rio Conventions to enhance collaboration among the conventions). 
 10.  See, e.g., RODA VERHEYEN, CLIMATE CHANGE DAMAGE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW: 
PREVENTION DUTIES AND STATE RESPONSIBILITY 43, 152‒53 (2005); Rebecca Elizabeth Jacobs, 
Treading Deep Waters: Substantive Law Issues in Tuvalu’s Threat to Sue the United States in the 
International Court of Justice, 14 PAC. RIM L. & POL’Y J. 103, 105 (2005); Jacqueline Peel, Issues in 
Climate Change Litigation, 5 CARBON & CLIMATE L. REV. 15, 15 (2011). 
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the marine environment and the duty to mitigate against climate change under 
international law. It will also consider recent jurisprudence, specifically the 
South China Sea Arbitration, which discussed the protection of the marine 
environment in disputed maritime space. The Article concludes that there is no 
single solution to resolve the issue of climate change, but a better understanding 
of the interconnected nature of the obligations of State parties under relevant 
treaties may provide further impetus for States to take climate change seriously 
and increase their efforts to negotiate and effectively implement additional 
agreements. The purpose of this Article is to contribute to the discussion of 
challenges associated with international litigation involving liability for climate 
change damages. It will proceed in four parts. 
Part I will discuss the South China Sea Arbitration and the protection of the 
marine environment while examining the implications of the award, which 
obligates States to protect the marine environment in disputed territorial and 
maritime space. Part II will be an analysis of marine contingency planning in the 
Asia-Pacific region in the context of the obligation of States to deal with the 
harmful effects of marine pollution within the UNCLOS framework. Part III will 
explore the challenges associated with litigation involving climate change 
damages. Part IV will outline the implications of the request for an advisory 
opinion before the International Tribunal for the Law of Sea. 
I.  SOUTH CHINA SEA ARBITRATION AND THE PROTECTION OF THE MARINE 
ENVIRONMENT: EVOLUTION OF UNCLOS PART XII THROUGH 
INTERPRETATION AND THE DUTY TO COOPERATE 
A.  UNCLOS Part XII and the Protection of the Marine Environment 
The protection and preservation of the marine environment constitute a 
prominent component of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 
(UNCLOS).11 Part XII of UNCLOS is the cornerstone of international 
environmental law of the sea and embodies a balance of competing social, 
economic, and environmental interests in the marine environment.12 On the 
surface, UNCLOS provisions in Part XII appear to be sufficiently broad to permit 
States to pursue a claim against another State for failure to mitigate 
 
 11.  See United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea arts. 192‒237, opened for signature Dec. 
10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397 [hereinafter UNCLOS] (entered into force Nov. 16, 1994); see also David 
M. Dzidzornu, Four Principles in Marine Environment Protection: A Comparative Analysis, 29 OCEAN 
DEV. & INT’L L. 91, 91 (1998); Eric Franckx, Regional Marine Environment Protection Regimes in the 
Context of UNCLOS, 13 INT’L J. MARINE & COASTAL L. 307, 310‒11 (1998); Moira L. McConnell & 
Edgar Gold, The Modern Law of the Sea: Framework for the Protection and Preservation of the Marine 
Environment?, 23 CASE WESTERN RES. J. INT’L L. 83, 85 (1991) (acknowledging that the marine 
environmental provisions of UNCLOS contain the highest-level global directives for the protection and 
preservation of the marine environment presently available) . 
 12.  Jonathan I. Charney, The Protection of the Marine Environment by the 1982 United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea, 7 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 731, 732 (1995). 
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environmental problems caused by climate change, as failing to do so would 
seem to fall short of States’ obligations to preserve and protect the marine 
environment.13 Under Article 194, States are obligated to preserve and protect 
the marine environment through preventing, controlling, and reducing 
pollution.14 States are also obligated to use the best practical means in 
accordance with a State’s capabilities to prevent pollution from spreading outside 
a State’s jurisdiction.15 These provisions of UNCLOS are relevant in establishing 
a potential claim against a State for failing to mitigate climate change with regard 
to the handling of its marine environment.16 
Regarding Part XII provisions of UNCLOS, it is conceivable that 
international tribunals will be able to make some connection to other 
international agreements. UNCLOS provides that an international court or 
tribunal with UNCLOS jurisdiction shall apply UNCLOS along with other rules 
of international law that are not incompatible with UNCLOS.17 This approach is 
consistent with the rules of treaty interpretation.18 
In particular, for member States of UNCLOS that are also State parties to 
the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD), the CBD may provide a new 
context for understanding the international legal implications for marine 
pollution and the efforts required to meet the obligations under UNCLOS to 
protect and preserve the marine environment.19 Because of the widespread 
acceptance of both conventions, the influence of the CBD on the interpretation 
of the marine environment provisions of UNCLOS may turn out to be substantial. 
It may be that to properly understand the State parties’ obligations under 
UNCLOS in Part XII, they should be examined in light of the general recognition 
that climate change is a significant threat to biological diversity.20 Moreover, 
 
 13.  Keely Boom, Exposure to Legal Risk for Climate Change Damage Under the UNFCCC, Kyoto 
Protocol and LOSC: A Case Study of Tuvalu and Australia 182‒92 (2012) (unpublished Ph.D. thesis, 
University of Wollongong), http://ro.uow.edu.au/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=4926&context =theses. 
 14.  UNCLOS, supra note 11, at art. 194, ¶ 1. 
 15.  Id. at art. 194, ¶ 2. 
 16.  The substantive provisions of Part XII of UNCLOS which are possible sources of legal 
exposure are Articles 192, 194, and 195. 
 17.  UNCLOS, supra note 11, at art. 293. 
 18.  See, e.g., Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties arts. 31, 32, opened for signature May 23, 
1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 (entered into force Jan. 27, 1980) (providing that any relevant rules of 
international law and supplementary means of interpretation may be consulted when interpreting a treaty). 
 19.  Convention on Biological Diversity art. 22, ¶ 2, opened for signature June 5, 1992, 1760 
U.N.T.S. 79 (entered into force Dec. 29, 1993) (“Contracting Parties shall implement this Convention 
with respect to the marine environment consistently with the rights and obligations of States under the law 
of the sea.”). 
 20.  See, e.g., Elisa Morgera, Far Away, So Close: A Legal Analysis of the Increasing Interactions 
Between the Convention on Biological Diversity and Climate Change Law, 2 CLIMATE L. 85, 113–15 
(2011) (discussing the increasing understanding of the links between global biodiversity loss and climate 
change, as well as the possible legal bases to support synergies between biodiversity law and climate 
change law); see also Michael Bowman, Conserving Biological Diversity in an Era of Climate Change: 
Local Implementation of International Wildlife Treaties, 53 GERMAN Y.B. INT’L L. 289, 291–92 (2010) 
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some legal recognition that biological diversity is crucial to good ecosystem 
health may be required. 
Given the link between climate change and the obligation to protect and 
preserve the marine environment under UNCLOS, the CBD is likely to play a 
significant role in interpreting the obligations of State parties to lessen the impact 
of climate change. Article 293 of UNCLOS invites the use of the CBD as an 
interpretative tool to the extent that it is not incompatible with UNCLOS.21 The 
application of the CBD as an interpretive tool would be limited to disputes 
involving Parties bound by both treaties.22 
The relative impacts of such an important connection between UNCLOS 
and the CBD are all the more relevant due to the result of the South China Sea 
Arbitration, as discussed in Section B. The implications of the South China Sea 
Arbitration on the protection of the marine environment and efforts to mitigate 
the impact of climate change are potentially twofold. First, the Award provides 
a precedent in which Part XII of UNCLOS can be linked to other environmental 
treaty regimes through interpretation. Second, the Award partially illustrates how 
the duty to cooperate emerges and operates in relation to other duties that fall 
under Part XII of UNCLOS. In other words, the Award establishes how the 
obligations found in Part XII can evolve through the duty to cooperate. 
B.  The South China Sea Arbitration and the Protection of the Marine 
Environment 
On July 12, 2016, the Arbitral Tribunal constituted under Annex VII of 
UNCLOS issued its final award in a dispute between the Philippines and China 
over maritime claims in the South China Sea.23 The ruling is groundbreaking for 
several reasons, principally the innovative interpretation and application of 
Articles 192 and 194 of UNCLOS imposing obligations on States to protect and 
preserve the marine environment in disputed territorial or maritime areas.24 
 
(noting the growing body of scholarship on issues arising out of the relationship between biodiversity and 
climate change). 
 21.  UNCLOS, supra note 11, at art. 293 (stating that the applicable law that a court or tribunal with 
jurisdiction shall apply will be the UNCLOS “and other rules of international law not incompatible with 
this Convention”). 
 22.  See Rüdiger Wolfrum & Nele Matz, Interplay of the United Nations Convention on the Law of 
the Sea and the Convention on Biological Diversity, 4 MAX PLANCK Y.B. UNITED NATIONS L. 445, 473–
74 (2000); see also In re South China Sea Arbitration (Phil. v. China), PCA Case Repository No. 2013-
19, Award of July 12, 2016, ¶¶ 159, 908 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2016) [hereinafter The South China Sea 
Arbitration Award of July 12, 2016]. 
 23.  The South China Sea Arbitration Award of July 12, 2016, supra note 22; see also Bernard H. 
Oxman, The South China Sea Arbitration Award, 24 U. MIAMI INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 235, 237 (2017) 
(recounting the details of the arbitral award). 
 24.  The Tribunal in its Award on Jurisdiction ruled that it has jurisdiction over the Philippines and 
the claim that “China has violated its obligations under the Convention to protect and preserve the marine 
environment at Scarborough Shoal, Second Thomas Shoal, Cuarteron Reef, Fiery Cross Reef, Gaven Reef, 
Johnson Reef, Hughes Reef and Subi Reef.” The South China Sea Arbitration Award of July 12, 2016, 
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The Philippines asserted that China’s tolerance of harmful fishing practices 
and harmful construction activities caused serious harm to the marine 
environment of the South China Sea.25 The Tribunal, on the basis of expert 
reports,26 ruled that “China’s artificial island-building activities on the seven 
reefs in the Spratly Islands have caused devastating and long-lasting damage to 
the marine environment.”27 The Tribunal held that China’s activities breached 
its obligation under Article 192 and Article 194(1), and that China “violated its 
duty under Article 194(5) to take measures necessary to protect and preserve rare 
or fragile ecosystems as well as the habitat of depleted, threatened or endangered 
species and other forms of marine life.”28 The Tribunal also concluded that 
“China has, through its toleration and protection of, and failure to prevent 
Chinese fishing vessels engaging in harmful harvesting activities of endangered 
species . . . breached Articles 192 and 194(5) of the Convention.”29 
The Tribunal placed primacy on the obligation of States to protect the 
marine environment even over disputed territorial and maritime areas by setting 
aside the question of sovereignty over the contested features.30 In the words of 
the Tribunal: 
[T]he obligations in Part XII apply to all States with respect to the marine 
environment in all maritime areas, both inside the national jurisdiction of 
States and beyond it. Accordingly, questions of sovereignty are irrelevant to 
the application of Part XII of the Convention. The Tribunal’s findings in this 
 
supra note 22, ¶¶ 112, 906‒11, 925‒38 (specifically, in connection with the marine environment, the 
Philippines asserted that China breached Articles 123, 192, 194, 197, 205, and 206 of UNCLOS); see also 
In re South China Sea Arbitration (Phil. v. China), PCA Case Repository No. 2013-19, Award on 
Jurisdiction & Admissibility, ¶¶ 101, 281, 408, 409, 413(G) (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2015) [hereinafter The South 
China Sea Arbitration Award of Oct. 29, 2015]. 
 25.  The South China Sea Arbitration Award of July 12, 2016, supra note 22, ¶¶ 817, 894–905, 966, 
983. 
 26.  See id. ¶ 821. The Tribunal appointed Dr. Sebastian C.A. Ferse of the Leibniz Center for 
Tropical Marine Ecology in Bremen, Germany to seek his independent opinion on the environmental 
impact of China’s construction activities. Id. The Tribunal also appointed Dr. Peter J. Mumby, a professor 
of coral reef ecology, and Dr. Selina Ward, both from the School of Biological Sciences at the University 
of Queensland, Australia, who provided their “Assessment of the Potential Environmental Consequences 
of Construction Activities on Seven Reefs in the Spratly Islands in the South China Sea.” Id. 
 27.  Id. ¶ 983. 
 28.  Id. Further, in the words of the Tribunal: “The Tribunal further finds that China has, through 
its island-building activities at Cuarteron Reef, Fiery Cross Reef, Gaven Reef (North), Johnson Reef, 
Hughes Reef, Subi Reef and Mischief Reef, breached Articles 192, 194(1), 194(5), 197, 123, and 206 of 
the Convention.” Id. ¶ 993. 
 29.  Id. ¶ 992 (specifically referring to activities at “Scarborough Shoal, Second Thomas Shoal and 
other features in the Spratly Islands.”). 
 30.  In its Award on Jurisdiction, the Tribunal held that the Philippines’ submission (Submission 
No. 11) “reflects a dispute concerning the protection and preservation of the marine environment at 
relevant features within the South China Sea and the application of Articles 192 and 194 of the 
Convention” and “not a dispute concerning sovereignty or maritime boundary delimitation, nor is it barred 
from the Tribunal’s consideration by any requirement of Section 1 of Part XV.” Id. ¶ 926; The South 
China Sea Arbitration Award of Oct. 29, 2015, supra note 24, ¶ 408. 
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Chapter have no bearing upon, and are not in any way dependent upon, which 
State is sovereign over features in the South China Sea.31 
The Tribunal ruled that China’s activities in the disputed areas and the 
effects of those activities on the marine environment did not concern sovereignty 
or maritime boundary delimitation.32 The Award noted that the environmental 
obligations in Part XII of UNCLOS “apply to States irrespective of where the 
alleged harmful activities took place.”33 It also noted that these obligations are 
independent from questions of sovereignty over any particular feature, from a 
prior determination of the status of any maritime feature, and from the prior 
delimitation of any overlapping entitlements.34 
C.  An Expansive Interpretation of Part XII 
The Tribunal sustained an expansive interpretive approach to Part XII of 
UNCLOS. In the Award, the Tribunal noted that while Article 192 of UNCLOS, 
which imposes upon State parties the obligation to protect and preserve the 
marine environment, is phrased in general terms, the content of this duty “is 
informed by the other provisions of Part XII and other applicable rules of 
international law”35 as well as by “specific obligations set out in other 
international agreements, as envisaged in Article 237 of the Convention.”36 In so 
doing, the Tribunal, by referring to the interface of the provisions of Part XII of 
UNCLOS and other relevant provisions contained in the “corpus of international 
law relating to the environment,”37 submits a very high standard of due diligence 
amongst State parties in relation to the scope of the obligations contained in Part 
XII of UNCLOS.38 
Generally, State parties have the obligation to protect the marine 
environment from future damage and to preserve the same by maintaining or 
improving its present condition.39 More specifically, the Tribunal interpreted 
Articles 192 and 194 of UNCLOS as setting forth obligations that apply not only 
 
 31.  The South China Sea Arbitration Award of July 12, 2016, supra note 22, ¶ 940. 
 32.  Id. ¶ 932; The South China Sea Arbitration Award of Oct. 29, 2015, supra note 24, ¶ 409. 
 33.  The South China Sea Arbitration Award of July 12, 2016, supra note 22, ¶ 927. 
 34.  Id.; The South China Sea Arbitration Award of Oct. 29, 2015, supra note 24, ¶ 408. 
 35.  The South China Sea Arbitration Award of July 12, 2016, supra note 22, ¶ 941. 
 36.  Id. ¶ 942. 
 37.  Id. ¶ 941. 
 38.  The Tribunal in its Award on Jurisdiction and Admissibility acknowledged that “some overlap 
in the subject matter of Part XII of the Convention and the subject matter of the CBD” exists. The South 
China Sea Arbitration Award of Oct. 29, 2015, supra note 24, ¶ 284. Further, “[t]he two treaties establish 
parallel environmental regimes that overlap” where “[o]ne creates a distinct jurisdiction to address the 
protection of the marine environment whilst the other aims to protect biodiversity in general.” Id. ¶ 285. 
However, the Tribunal clarified that whilst the “same facts may give rise to violations of both treaties,” it 
still agreed with the argument of the Philippines that a “dispute under UNCLOS does not become a dispute 
under the CBD merely because there is some overlap between the two. Parallel regimes remain parallel 
regimes.” Id. 
 39.  The South China Sea Arbitration Award of July 12, 2016, supra note 22, ¶ 941. 
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to activities directly undertaken by States, but also to ensure activities “within 
their jurisdiction and control do not harm the marine environment.”40 The 
Tribunal clarified that Article 192 carries the dual obligation “to take active 
measures to protect and preserve the marine environment, and by logical 
implication, entails the negative obligation not to degrade the marine 
environment.”41 Furthermore, the general obligations in Article 192 require 
States to “ensure that activities within their jurisdiction and control respect the 
environment of other States or of areas beyond national control.”42 In the context 
of the South China Sea and in relation to the complained of activities by China, 
this includes the positive duty of States “to prevent, or at least mitigate significant 
harm to the environment when pursuing large-scale construction activities.”43 
The first implication of this expansive interpretation is that it provides a 
precedent linking Part XII of UNCLOS to other environmental treaty regimes. 
The unique character of UNCLOS as a “Constitution of the Oceans” allows it to 
be flexible and responsive enough to deal with emerging problems as a living 
instrument.44 There are potentially a number of conventions that could be taken 
into account to clarify the numerous generic terms that are found in UNCLOS 
that are not specifically defined.45 Further, even when UNCLOS does provide a 
 
 40.  Id. ¶¶ 944, 945. The Tribunal draws this interpretation from the Fisheries Advisory Opinion of 
the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, the decision of International Court of Justice in Pulp 
Mills on the River Uruguay, the Seabed Disputes Chamber advisory opinion, and the Chagos Marine 
Protected Area arbitration. See id.; see also Request for an Advisory Opinion Submitted by the Sub-
Regional Fisheries Commission (SRFC), Case No. 21, Advisory Opinion of Apr. 2, 2015, 15 ITLOS Rep. 
4, 36–42 ¶¶ 118‒36; Southern Bluefin Tuna Cases (N.Z. v. Japan; Austl. v. Japan), Case Nos. 3 & 4, 
Requests for Provisional Measures, Order of Aug. 27, 1999, 3 ITLOS Rep. 280, 295, ¶ 70, [hereinafter 
Southern Bluefin Tuna Cases]; Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Arg. v. Uru.), Judgment, 2010 I.C.J. 
Rep. 14, 79–80, ¶ 197 (Apr. 20) [hereinafter Pulp Mills Case]; Responsibilities and Obligations of States 
Sponsoring Persons and Entities With Respect to Activities in the Area (Request for Advisory Opinion 
submitted to the Seabed Disputes Chamber), Case. No. 17, Advisory Opinion of Feb. 1, 2011, 11 ITLOS 
Rep. 10, 41–42, ¶¶ 112, 113; In re Chagos Marine Protected Area Arbitration (Mauritius v. U.K.), PCA 
Case Repository No. 2011-03, Award of Mar. 18, 2015, ¶¶ 320–538 (Per. Ct. Arb. 2015). 
 41.  The South China Sea Arbitration Award of July 12, 2016, supra note 22, ¶ 941. 
 42.  Id. 
 43.  Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 44.  However, the effect on Statehood of climate change and sea level rise is an example of a 
problem that UNCLOS does not directly address. See, e.g., Michael Gagain, Climate Change, Sea Level 
Rise, and Artificial Islands: Saving the Maldives’ Statehood and Maritime Claims Through the 
‘Constitution of the Oceans,’ 23 COLO. J. INT’L ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 77, 82 (2012). 
 45.  For instance, in addition to UNCLOS, there are other international treaties of global application 
that also cover the protection of the marine environment from pollution caused by the dumping of waste 
and other matter into the ocean. See, e.g., 1996 Protocol to the Convention on the Prevention of Marine 
Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter, opened for signature Nov. 7, 1996, 36 I.L.M. 1 (1997) 
[hereinafter 1996 Protocol to the London Convention of 1972] (entered into force Mar. 24, 2006); 
Convention for the Prevention of Marine Pollution from Land-Based Sources art. 1, opened for signature 
June 4, 1974, 1546 U.N.T.S. 119 [hereinafter Paris Convention] (entered into force May 6, 1978); 
Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter art. 1, opened 
for signature Dec. 29, 1972, 26 U.S.T. 2403 [hereinafter London Convention] (entered into force Aug. 
30, 1975). 
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definition, as it does in the case of the term “pollution of the marine 
environment,” a term’s meaning will need to be updated as time passes to address 
new challenges.46 For instance, the argument has been made that the protection 
of the marine environment from global climate change cannot be resolved 
without interpreting the UNCLOS provisions in light of the Montreal Protocol 
on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer,47 and the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC)48 and its associated 
international agreements.49 
The question then arises as to whether the South China Sea Arbitration 
demonstrates a way for Article 192 of UNCLOS to become a tool to deal with 
significant threats to the marine environment. The Tribunal’s decision clearly 
provides that the provisions of Part XII and other applicable rules of international 
law inform the content of Article 192.50 The Tribunal found that the duty to 
prevent the harvest of endangered species based on Article 192—which applies 
in the context of fragile ecosystems by virtue of Article 194(5)—and must be 
“read against the background of other applicable international law.”51 In the 
Award, a due diligence obligation to prevent the harvesting of endangered 
species, including giant clams and sea turtles, was deduced from Articles 192 
and 194(5) in the light of the CBD52 and the Convention on International Trade 
in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES).53 
 
 46.  UNCLOS, supra note 11, at art. 1, ¶ 1, § 4; see, e.g., Erik Franckx, Coastal State Jurisdiction 
with Respect to Marine Pollution—Some Recent Developments and Future Challenges, 10 INT’L J. 
MARINE & COASTAL L. 253, 256–57 (1995) (arguing that the status quo on the protection and preservation 
of the marine environment as written down in the 1982 Convention is currently under pressure); Kristina 
M. Gjerde, Challenges to Protecting the Marine Environment Beyond National Jurisdiction, 27 INT’L J. 
MARINE & COASTAL L. 839, 846–47 (2012) (arguing for the possibility of building and modernizing the 
relevant framework and noting that the Convention paved the way for the continuous upgrade of 
international rules and standards); Antonio J. Rodriguez et al., Evolution of Marine Pollution Law, 1966–
2016, 91 TUL. L. REV. 1009, 1024, 1043 (2017) (discussing how major oil spills and releases of hazardous 
substances have pushed marine pollution law since 1966 to increase dramatically the scope of regulation, 
liability of polluters, and mechanisms to ensure funding for cleaning up spills and compensation for 
damages). 
 47.  Alan Boyle, Law of the Sea Perspectives on Climate Change, 27 INT’L J. MARINE & COASTAL 
L. 831, 834 -836 (2012). See also Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, Sept. 
14‒16, 1987, 1522 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force Jan. 1, 1989). 
 48.  UNFCCC, supra note 2. 
 49.  There are other international instruments on the protection of the atmosphere. See, e.g., Kyoto 
Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, adopted Dec. 11, 1997, 2303 
U.N.T.S. 162, (entered into force Feb. 16, 2005); Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone 
Layer, opened for signature Mar. 22, 1985, T.I.A.S. No. 11,097 (entered into force Sept. 22, 1988). 
 50.  The South China Sea Arbitration Award of July 12, 2016, supra note 22, ¶¶ 941‒49. 
 51.  Id. ¶ 959. 
 52.  Id. ¶ 945; Convention on Biological Diversity, supra note 19. 
 53.  The South China Sea Arbitration Award of July 12, 2016, supra note 22, ¶ 956; Convention on 
International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora, opened for signature Mar. 3, 1973, 
27 U.S.T. 1087 (entered into force July 1, 1975). 
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However, in addition to this, the Tribunal expounded that the due diligence 
obligation imposed under Article 192 encompasses not just the obligation “to 
take those measures ‘necessary to protect and preserve rare or fragile ecosystems 
as well as the habitat of depleted, threatened or endangered species and other 
forms of marine life,’” but also “extends to the prevention of harms that would 
affect depleted, threatened, or endangered species indirectly through the 
destruction of their habitat.”54 Undoubtedly, Article 192 is now a framework 
provision that requires a living interpretation in the light of the developments in 
international law. 
The second implication of the expansive interpretation concerns the 
evolving nature of UNCLOS Part XII with respect to the legal principle of the 
duty to cooperate.55 The importance of the duty to cooperate has been recognized 
especially in the field of international environmental law, where rules and 
principles continue to develop and where compliance with these rules and 
principles are brought about by cooperation rather than the imposition of legal 
liability and fault.56 International tribunals, including, most notably, the 
International Court of Justice (ICJ) and the International Tribunal for the Law of 
 
 54.  The South China Sea Arbitration Award of July 12, 2016, supra note 22, ¶ 959 (quoting 
UNCLOS Article 192). In this regard, the Tribunal considers the harvesting of sea turtles, species 
threatened with extinction, and the harvesting of corals and giant clams from the waters surrounding 
Scarborough Shoal and features in the Spratly Islands to constitute a harm to the marine environment. Id. 
¶ 960. Therefore, in the view of the Tribunal, “a failure to take measures to prevent these practices would 
constitute a breach of Articles 192 and 194(5) of the Convention.” Id. 
 55.  UNCLOS contains various provisions that impose the duty to cooperate on States  
parties. These include, Articles 41, 43, 61(2), 64(1), 65, 66, 69(4), 70(4), 94(7), 98 (2), 100, 108  
(1), 109(1), 117, 118, 123, 129, 130, 144(2), 151(1)(a), 197, 199, 200, 201, 226(2), 235(3), 243,  
266(1), 273, 276(2), and 303. The duty to cooperate is specifically mentioned in several provisions  
Of Part XII of UNCLOS. These include Article 197, which provides that: 
 States shall co-operate on a global basis and, as appropriate, on a regional basis, directly or 
through competent international organizations, in formulating and elaborating international 
rules, standards and recommended practices and procedures consistent with this Convention, 
for the protection and preservation of the marine environment, taking into account 
characteristic regional features. 
The duty to cooperate is also found in Article 199, on contingency plans against pollution; in Article 
200 on studies, research programmes and exchange of information and data acquired about pollution 
of the marine environment; in Article 201, in establishing appropriate scientific criteria for the 
formulation and elaboration of rules, standards and recommended practices and procedures for the 
prevention, reduction, and control of pollution of the marine environment; in Article 226(2), which 
enjoins State to cooperate to develop procedures for the avoidance of unnecessary physical 
inspection of vessels at sea; and in Article 235(3), which imposes on States the duty to cooperate on 
international law relating to “responsibility and liability for the assessment of and compensation for 
damage and the settlement of related disputes” and the “development of criteria and procedures for 
payment of adequate compensation.” 
 56.  See, e.g., Margaret A. Young & Sebastián Rioseco Sullivan, Evolution Through the Duty to 
Cooperate: Implications of the Whaling Case at the International Court of Justice, 16 MELB. J. INT’L L. 
311, 328‒38 (2015) (discussing the duty to cooperate in the context of the whaling regime). 
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the Sea (ITLOS), have on occasion expounded on the duty to cooperate.57 The 
Arbitral Tribunal’s emphasis on the importance of cooperation, coordination, 
and communication appears to endorse the existence of the duty to cooperate as 
a fundamental principle of Part XII as well as a principle under general 
international law.58 Given this, the scope of application appears to be wider than 
the explicit formulation of the duty to cooperate under Articles 123 and 197 of 
UNCLOS. 
II.  CAN STATES MOVE FROM DISASTER RELIEF TO DISASTER RISK 
REDUCTION?: IMPROVING NATIONAL AND REGIONAL MARINE POLLUTION 
CONTINGENCY PLANNING IN THE ASIA-PACIFIC 
A.  The Obligation to Engage in Marine Contingency Planning 
In considering whether a case could be made for using Part XII of UNCLOS 
to establish liability for the impact of climate change on the marine environment, 
it should be noted that States already have a perceived obligation to take 
proactive measures to deal with the harmful effects of marine pollution in 
contrast to a reactive approach.59 
Within the UNCLOS framework, States agreed in Article 198 and Article 
199 to “immediately notify other States” and “competent international 
organizations” likely to be affected by a pollution incident and to “jointly 
develop and promote contingency plans” so that States can best coordinate their 
efforts “to the extent possible, in eliminating the effects of pollution and 
preventing or minimizing the damage.”60 When read together, Article 198 and 
Article 199 appear to establish a positive obligation for State parties to engage in 
marine contingency planning. Marine pollution contingency plans respond to 
marine pollution disasters and emergencies in order to protect marine 
resources.61 In light of existing State practices of marine contingency planning 
and opinio juris, these UNCLOS provisions also appear to codify an established 
customary international rule.62 
 
 57.  The MOX Plant Case (Ir. v. U.K.), Case No. 10, Order of Dec. 3, 2001, 5 ITLOS Rep. 95, 110 
¶ 82 [hereinafter The MOX Plant Case]; Land Reclamation in and Around the Straits of Johor (Malay. v. 
Sing.), Case No. 12, Order of Oct. 8, 2003, 7 ITLOS Rep. 10, 25 ¶ 92 [hereinafter Straits of Johor Case]; 
Request for an Advisory Opinion Submitted by the Sub-Regional Fisheries Commission (SRFC), supra 
note 40, at 43, ¶ 140; Pulp Mills Case, supra note 40, at 49, ¶ 77. 
 58.  The South China Sea Arbitration Award of July 12, 2016, supra note 22, ¶¶ 946, 985. 
 59.  Id. ¶ 941. 
 60.  UNCLOS, supra note 11, at arts. 198, 199. 
 61.  ANASTASIA TELESETSKY ET AL., MARINE POLLUTION CONTINGENCY PLANNING: STATE 
PRACTICE IN ASIA-PACIFIC STATES 3 (2017). 
 62.  See, e.g., Constantinos Triantafillou et al., Contingency Planning in the European Union: The 
Importance of Cooperation Between States, 21 OCEAN Y.B. 427, 431–35 (2007) (outlining the pollution 
response frameworks at the national, regional, European, and international levels pertaining to major 
marine pollution incidents within European waters); see also Tony George Puthucherril, Adapting to 
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States are accorded a great deal of latitude in deciding what might trigger 
the operation of a contingency plan to protect marine resources. While Article 
198 clearly establishes the principle of prevention by calling upon States to report 
not just actual damage but also situations that pose “imminent danger,” the 
Article does not provide for a specific standard as to the degree of damage 
incurred that requires notification. Once notification under Article 198 is given, 
States are expected, however, to proceed under the contingency plans developed 
under Article 199 with assistance from competent international organizations.63 
It is apparent than an implicit “due diligence” requirement on the part of all 
UNCLOS State parties is embedded in Article 198. The phrase “becomes aware” 
suggests that a State must take the initiative to patrol within its own borders and 
maritime zones to identify incidents of potential pollution damage.64 Whether a 
State will ultimately provide notification to other States after an inspection of its 
waters within its jurisdiction will depend upon how comprehensively the State 
defines “pollution.”65 Under the UNCLOS definition of pollution, a broad range 
of events might require notification under Article 198.66 
The emphasis in Article 199 on the establishment of contingency plans 
originated from the treaty drafters’ view that there should be facilitation of 
technical assistance for developing States coping with marine pollution 
damage.67 However, it is not obvious from a plain reading of the text of 
UNCLOS that the idea of extending technical assistance to developing States for 
 
Climate Change and Accelerated Sea-Level Rise Through Integrated Coastal Zone Management Laws: A 
Study of the South Asian Experience, 26 OCEAN Y.B. 533, 544–82 (2012) (examining the coastal zone 
management legal regimes in the South Asian littoral countries and how they further the concept of 
integrated coastal zone management and facilitate adaptation to climate change). 
 63.  UNCLOS, supra note 11, at arts. 198, 199; see, e.g., International Convention on Oil Pollution, 
Preparedness, Response and Cooperation art. 5, ¶¶ 2, 3, adopted Nov. 30, 1990, 1891 U.N.T.S. 78 (entered 
into force May 13, 1995) (encouraging States to inform the International Maritime Organization (IMO) 
of severe oil pollution incidents). 
 64.  UNCLOS, supra note 11, at art. 198. 
 65.  For example, member States of the IMO negotiated the 2000 Protocol on Preparedness, 
Response and Co-operation to Pollution Incidents by Hazardous and Noxious Substances, which was 
adopted on March 15, 2000, and entered into force on June 14, 2007. This provides a global framework 
for international co-operation in combating major incidents or threats of marine pollution. Protocol on 
Preparedness, Response and Co-operation to Pollution Incidents by Hazardous and Noxious Substances, 
adopted Mar. 15, 2000, [2007] A.T.S. 47 (Austl.). Article 2, paragraph 2 defines “[h]azardous and noxious 
substances” as “any substance other than oil which, if introduced into the marine environment is likely to 
create hazards to human health, to harm living resources and marine life, to damage amenities or to 
interfere with other legitimate uses of the sea.” Id. at art. 2, ¶ 2. 
 66.  UNCLOS, supra note 11, at art. 1, ¶ 1 (defining “pollution of the marine environment” as “the 
introduction by man, directly or indirectly, of substances or energy into the marine environment, including 
estuaries, which results or is likely to result in such deleterious effects as harm to living resources and 
marine life, hazards to human health, hindrance to marine activities, including fishing and other legitimate 
uses of the sea, impairment of quality for use of sea water and reduction of amenities”). 
 67.  MYRON NORDQUIST, UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE SEA 1982: A 
COMMENTARY, VOLUME IV 88 (1990). 
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marine contingency planning is present in the Convention.68 The only textual 
reference to the differing capacity of developing States is the first sentence of 
Article 199, which provides that “States in the area affected, in accordance with 
their capabilities, and the competent international organizations shall co-operate, 
to the extent possible” in handling a pollution incident.69 In contrast, the 
remaining obligation in Article 199, to “jointly develop and promote contingency 
plans for responding to pollution incidents in the marine environment,” is 
applicable to all States.70 
B.  State Practice in Marine Contingency Planning in the Asia-Pacific Region 
Analysis of State practices in marine contingency planning in the Asia-
Pacific region leads to two principal observations. First, States in the region 
generally devised or substantially amended their national marine contingency 
plans in response to catastrophic oil spills within their own waters.71 This 
suggests that the evolution of national marine contingency planning tended to be 
more individually reactive. Even when catastrophic events occur, such as the 
Deepwater Horizon oil spill, States that are not the locus of the accident tend not 
to view such external disasters as an opportunity to reflect critically on their own 
operational preparedness.72 
Second, Asia-Pacific States vary in terms of the availability of public and 
private resources available to respond to marine pollution incidents.73 It is 
apparent creating an emergency response communication network that can 
 
 68.  However, UNCLOS in its text refers to the preferential treatment given to, as well as the 
obligation to provide scientific and technical assistance to developing States. See UNCLOS, supra note 
11, at arts. 202, 203, 266, 269, 274. 
 69.  Id. at art. 199. 
 70.  Id.; NORDQUIST, supra note 67, at 87. 
 71.  For example, in the case of the Philippines, Oil Pollution Compensation Act of 2007, Republic 
Act No. 9483, 2 June 2007, was enacted in the aftermath of the M/T Solar 1 incident. In the case of 
Australia, the catalyst for the inception of the National Contingency Plan was the 1970 Oceanic Grandeur 
incident. In 1997, Japan after the Nakhodka oil spill revealed that its oil spill preparedness and response 
regime were insufficient to address large-scale marine pollution incidents. 
 72.  There are ample academic literature on lessons learned from the Deepwater Horizon incident, 
see for example, Martin Davies, Liability Issues Raised by the Deepwater Horizon Blowout, 25 AUSTL. & 
N.Z. MAR. L.J. 35 (2011), and Vincent J. Foley, Deepwater Horizon: The Legal Fallout—The Framework 
for Liability, Fines, and Penalties for Oil Pollution, 22 ENVTL. CLAIMS J. 280 (2010), and Vincent J. 
Foley, Post-Deepwater Horizon: The Changing Landscape of Liability for Oil Pollution in the United 
States, 74 ALB. L. REV. 515 (2010), and Thomas C. Galligan, Jr., A Sad Tale of the Deepwater Horizon 
Disaster, Normal Accidents, and Our Appetite for Risk, 17 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 264 (2012), and 
Hari M. Osofsky, Multidimensional Governance and the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill, 63 FLA. L. 
REV. 1077 (2011). 
 73.  See Ma. Gregoria Joanne P. Tiquio et al., Management Frameworks for Coastal and Marine 
Pollution in the European and South East Asian Regions, 135 OCEAN & COASTAL MGMT. 65, 72–73 
(2017). 
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effectively link local, regional, and national entities capable of providing 
practical responses to marine pollution incidents is a recurring challenge.74 
Given the shift away from a reactive approach to marine pollution, the need 
has emerged for a systemic change in which States regard contingency planning 
as part of a proactive and adaptive management process. This requires that States 
actively seek, as part of an iterative learning process, to design responses to new 
types of marine oil pollution scenarios. For example, States should consider the 
unique emergency scenarios that may arise with the operation of new classes of 
transport vessels, such as ultra-large crude carriers. States should also examine 
the impact climate change might have on oil pollution responses. For example, 
States should examine if changes in ocean currents will impact existing oil spill 
dispersion models or if there should be changes to the location, access to, and 
deployment of response equipment storage. Ultimately, despite limited resources 
and capacity, States in the Asia-Pacific should maintain comprehensive, 
integrated, and robust national contingency planning responses based on sound 
domestic legal and policy structures in order to protect and preserve ocean and 
coastal resources. 
III.  PART XII AND THE DUTY TO MITIGATE AGAINST CLIMATE CHANGE: 
MAKING OUT A CLAIM, CAUSATION, AND RELATED ISSUES 
UNCLOS is the key international legal instrument, outside of the climate 
change regime, which could be a potential source of international litigation on 
climate change. However, there are a number of issues that may arise in such 
litigation, including choice of the most effective international forum, the 
difficulty of establishing jurisdiction, attribution, causation, and apportionment 
of liability and responsibility.75 
The UNFCCC in its preamble recognizes that  
States have, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and the 
principles of international law, the sovereign right to exploit their own 
resources pursuant to their own environmental and developmental policies, 
and the responsibility to ensure that activities within their jurisdiction or 
control do not cause damage to the environment of other States or of areas 
beyond the limits of national jurisdiction.76  
 
 74.  See, e.g., Suk Kyoon Kim, Marine Pollution Response in Northeast Asia and the NOWPAP 
Regime, 46 OCEAN DEV. & INT’L L. 17, 30 (2015) (arguing for closer cooperation within the region with 
respect to marine pollution preparedness and response); Jae-Hyup Lee, Transboundary Pollution in 
Northeast Asia: An International Environmental Law Perspective, 35 U. HAW. L. REV. 769, 775–77 
(2013); Craig Forrest, State Cooperation in Combating Transboundary Marine Pollution in South East 
Asia, 30 AUSTL. & N.Z. MAR. L.J. 78 (2016) (considering the degree to which a collaborative international 
legal framework exists in Southeast Asia for pollution arising from shipping and offshore oil and gas 
activities). 
 75.  Boom, supra note 13, at 229. 
 76.  UNFCCC, supra note 2, at pmbl. 
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However, the text of the UNFCCC does not contain provisions that define 
damages caused by climate change or provisions that address the issue of 
compensation for damages from climate change.77 In view of this, there are some 
State parties to the UNFCCC which have expressed reservations that their 
ratification of the Convention does not constitute a renunciation of their rights 
under international law concerning State responsibility for the adverse effects of 
climate change and that no provisions in the Convention can be interpreted as 
derogating from the principles of general international law.78 
The dispute settlement mechanism provided under the legal framework of 
UNCLOS establishes a compulsory and binding framework for the peaceful 
settlement of all ocean-related disputes.79 In Part XV of UNCLOS, State parties 
have the duty to settle any dispute concerning the interpretation or application of 
the Convention by peaceful means in accordance with Article 2(3) of the Charter 
of the United Nations80 and to seek a solution using any of the means indicated 
in Article 33(1) of the Charter.81 The unique nature of compulsory jurisdiction 
under UNCLOS creates an attractive feature for claimant States for climate 
change damage.82 
A.  Climate Change and UNCLOS 
Climate change is an issue that was not yet in the global environmental 
agenda during the time UNCLOS was negotiated.83 It is thus not a surprise that 
the text and travaux preparatoire of UNCLOS do not contain any direct 
references to climate change.84 However, whilst UNCLOS was not negotiated 
and drafted to address issues related to climate change, there are provisions in 
Part XII on the marine environment that could theoretically apply to climate 
 
 77.  Voigt, supra note 8, at 4.  
 78.  The Governments of Nauru, Tuvalu, Fiji, Kiribati, and Papua New Guinea submitted 
declarations that the provisions of the UNFCCC “shall in no way constitute a renunciation of any rights 
under international law concerning state responsibility for the adverse effects of climate change” or a 
derogation of “principles of general international law.” UNFCCC, supra note 2 (Declarations by Parties). 
 79.  Rosemary Rayfuse, The Future of Compulsory Dispute Settlement Under the Law of the Sea 
Convention, 30 VICT. U. WELLINGTON L. REV. 683, 684‒85 (2005); see also Anne Sheehan, Dispute 
Settlement Under UNCLOS: The Exclusion of Maritime Delimitation Disputes, 24 U. QUEENSL. L.J. 165, 
165 (2005). 
 80.  U.N. Charter art. 2, ¶ 3 (“All Members shall settle their international disputes by peaceful means 
in such a manner that international peace and security, and justice, are not endangered.”). 
 81.  The UN Charter lists the following means of peaceful settlement, which should be used by 
member states in settling their disputes: “[N]egotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, 
judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own 
choice.” Id. at art. 33. 
 82.  Boom, supra note 13, at 198. 
 83.  Alan Boyle, Law of the Sea Perspectives on Climate Change, 27 INT’L J. MARINE & COASTAL 
L. 831, 834–36 (2012). 
 84.  See Meinhard Doelle, Climate Change and the Use of the Dispute Settlement Regime of the 
Law of the Sea Convention, 37 OCEAN DEV. & INT’L L. 319, 321 (2006). 
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change, greenhouse emissions, ocean acidification, and even the responsibility 
of States to not cause transboundary climate change.85 Such provisions could 
also bring accompanying liability for such damages under international law.86 
UNCLOS provides for a general obligation on all State parties to “take all 
measures necessary to ensure that activities under their jurisdiction or control are 
so conducted as not to cause damage by pollution to other States and their 
environment, and that pollution arising from incidents or activities under their 
jurisdiction or control does not spread beyond the areas where they exercise 
sovereign rights.”87 UNCLOS Article 195 provides that States, in undertaking 
measures to prevent, reduce, and control pollution of the marine environment, 
have the obligation “not to transfer, directly or indirectly, damage or hazards 
from one area to another or transform one type of pollution into another.”88 This 
is a reflection of the “no harm rule,” which prohibits transboundary 
environmental damage.89 This could be applied in the context of transboundary 
harm caused by climate change: for instance, when greenhouse gas emissions 
from one State cause damage to the marine environment of another State.90 
Article 207 of UNCLOS requires States to “adopt laws and regulations to 
prevent, reduce and control pollution of the marine environment from land-based 
sources . . . taking into account internationally agreed rules, standards and 
recommended practices and procedures.”91 Article 212 of UNCLOS covers 
marine pollution from and through the atmosphere, which requires States to 
“adopt laws and regulations to prevent, reduce and control” such pollution, 
“taking into account internationally agreed rules, standards and recommended 
practices and procedures and the safety of air navigation.”92 It could be argued 
that a State party could rely on Article 212 to apply UNCLOS to the damage 
caused by climate change through the breach of another State party that has failed 
 
 85.  Boyle, supra note 83, at 834–36. 
 86.  See, e.g., id. at 834–35 (discussing potential liability under UNCLOS and the  
Kyoto Protocol). 
 87.  UNCLOS, supra note 11, at art. 194, ¶ 2. 
 88.  Id. at art. 195. 
 89.  For further discussion of the no harm rule, see Benoît Mayer, The Relevance of the No-Harm 
Principle to Climate Change Law and Politics, 19 ASIA PAC. J. ENVT’L L. 79, 79 (2016), and Kerryn 
Brent et al., Does the ‘No-Harm’ Rule Have a Role in Preventing Transboundary Harm and Harm to the 
Global Atmospheric Commons from Geoengineering?, 5 CLIMATE L. 35, 37 (2015). 
 90.  Boom, supra note 13, at 191. Boom also argues that “a claimant State could rely upon Article 
195 in relation to the process of ocean acidification,” since “it could be argued that the uptake of additional 
CO2 as a mitigation action in order to reduce atmospheric concentrations would equate to the 
transformation of one type of pollution into another.” Id. 
 91.  UNCLOS, supra note 11, at art. 207, ¶ 1. 
 92.  Id. at art. 212, ¶ 1. 
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to adopt laws and regulations to prevent, reduce, and control pollution from 
atmospheric sources.93 
Article 235 of UNCLOS provides that “States are responsible for the 
fulfillment of their international obligations concerning the protection and 
preservation of the marine environment.”94 The same Article does not 
specifically mention State responsibility but provides that States “shall be liable 
in accordance with international law.”95 Furthermore, Article 235, paragraph 3 
of UNCLOS provides a possible connection between UNCLOS and the 
UNFCCC, the Kyoto Protocol, the Paris Agreement, and other climate-related 
international instruments.96 UNCLOS should be read, interpreted, and applied 
alongside marine pollution agreements.97 
B.  Challenges of Jurisdiction, Causation, and Related Issues 
Assuming that the legal obligation for States to protect and preserve the 
marine environment derived from UNCLOS is extended to also require State 
parties to mitigate the effects of climate change, it will bring up the thorny issue 
of causation.98 The main challenge for any claim made against a State would be 
the ability of the claimant to establish a causal link between the failure of a 
particular State to fulfill its obligation on the one hand and the harmful effect of 
climate change on the marine environment on the other.99 
The argument certainly could be made that a failure to mitigate the effects 
of climate change would result in marine environment pollution as defined by 
UNCLOS.100 Thus, a failure to prevent pollution could be considered a violation 
of the parties’ UNCLOS obligations “to protect and preserve the marine 
 
 93.  See William C. G. Burns, Potential Causes of Action for Climate Change Damages in 
International Fora: The Law of the Sea Convention, 2 MCGILL INT’L J. SUSTAINABLE DEV. L. & POL’Y 
27, 46‒47 (2006). 
 94.  UNCLOS, supra note 11, at art. 235, ¶ 1. 
 95.  Id.; see also Boyle, supra note 83, at 834–36 (discussing State liability under the Kyoto Protocol 
and UNCLOS). 
 96.  UNCLOS, supra note 11, at art. 235, ¶ 3 (“States shall co-operate in the implementation of 
existing international law and the further development of international law . . . .”). 
 97.  See, e.g., 1996 Protocol to the London Convention of 1972, supra note 45; Paris Convention, 
supra note 45; London Convention, supra note 45; Convention for the Prevention of Marine Pollution by 
Dumping from Ships and Aircraft, adopted Feb. 15, 1972, 932 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force Apr. 7, 
1974). 
 98.  Doelle, supra note 84, at 324‒25. 
 99.  See Eric Biber, Climate Change, Causation, and Delayed Harm, 37 HOFSTRA L. REV. 975, 976 
(2008) (noting that causation is difficult in this context because the effects of climate change are delayed); 
Malgosia Fitzmaurice, Responsibility and Climate Change, 53 GERMAN Y.B. INT’L L. 89, 122 (2010); 
David A Grossman, Warming Up to a Not-So-Radical Idea: Tort-Based Climate Change Litigation, 28 
COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 1, 22‒27 (2003); cf. Robert F. Blomquist, Comparative Climate Change Torts, 46 
VAL. U. L. REV. 1053, 1060–73 (2012) (noting that the causation requirement creates a significant hurdle 
in establishing liability for climate change under Australian law, Chinese law, Israeli law, and South 
African law). 
 100.  See UNCLOS, supra note 11, at art. 1, ¶ 1, § 4; Boom, supra note 13, at 182‒84. 
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environment.”101 However, the extent to which the contribution to climate 
change by a particular State party or a number of State parties can be isolated as 
to establish sufficient legal cause for liability would be very difficult to 
determine. Problems would arise, such as how to determine the relative level of 
contribution of a particular State in comparison to other countries, the capacity 
of the State to reduce pollution, and the effect of the historical contribution to 
overall pollution levels. This would create significant challenges in determining 
whether a party failed to take sufficient action to mitigate its climate change 
impact on the marine environment. 
It is unlikely that whether the State is a party to one or more Conventions 
such as UNCLOS, CBD, UNFCCC, or the Paris Agreement would be 
determinative for establishing liability.102 It is likely that a claimant State would 
be a developing country that would be highly vulnerable to climate change and 
have a heavy economic and social reliance on the marine environment,103 while 
the defending Party would most likely be a developed State.104 The higher the 
historic and present contribution to climate change by the defending Party, 
arguably the better the chance of a successful outcome. The United States, for 
example, has not ratified UNCLOS and is, therefore, as a large State which 
would otherwise likely be defending against a claimant State, not at risk of being 
brought before an UNCLOS tribunal.105 Even if the relevant provisions of 
protection of the marine environment are declared as customary international 
law, since the United States does not accept the compulsory jurisdiction of the 
ICJ, the Court would be without authority.106 
 
 101.  See UNCLOS, supra note 11, at art. 192. 
 102.  The Paris Agreement was adopted on December 12, 2015 at the twenty-first session of the 
Conference of the Parties to the UNFCCC held in Paris from November 30 to December 13, 2015. The 
Paris Agreement entered into force on November 4, 2016, in accordance with Article 21(1). 
 103.  See, e.g., Mariya Gromilova, Rescuing the People of Tuvalu: Towards an I.C.J. Advisory 
Opinion on the International Legal Obligations to Protect the Environment and Human Rights of 
Populations Affected by Climate Change, 10 INTERCULTURAL HUM. RTS. L. REV. 233, 233‒35 (2015) 
(highlighting the particular situation of the island of Tuvalu); Hannah Stallard, Turning Up the Heat on 
Tuvalu: An Assessment of Potential Compensation for Climate Change Damage in Accordance with State 
Responsibility Under International Law, 15 CANTERBURY L. REV. 163, 167–70 (2009) (discussing the 
climate change damage Tuvalu will face). 
 104.  A good example would be Australia. See Doelle, supra note 84, at 325. Another good example 
would be China and the United States. See Cass R. Sunstein, The World vs. the United States and China? 
The Complex Climate Change Incentives of the Leading Greenhouse Gas Emitters, 55 UCLA L. REV. 
1675, 1677 (2008). 
 105.  See Randall S. Abate, Climate Change, the United States, and the Impacts of Arctic Melting: A 
Case Study in the Need for Enforceable International Environmental Human Rights, 26 STAN. ENVTL. 
L.J. 3, 62 (2007) (noting that the United States has only signed UNCLOS). 
 106.  Andrew L. Strauss, The Legal Option: Suing the United States in International Forums for 
Global Warming Emissions, 33 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. Law Inst.) 10,185, 10,185‒86 (Jan. 1, 2003). In 
1985, the United States withdrew its acceptance of compulsory jurisdiction of the Court before the second 
hearing of the Nicaragua case before the ICJ. Id. There would be little motivation for the United States to 
submit itself voluntarily to the jurisdiction of the ICJ if such submission will only open the possibility of 
an adverse judgment against the United States. 
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The ability of States to opt out of the binding dispute resolution process 
under UNFCCC also poses a challenge. Assuming that all relevant parties have 
ratified both UNCLOS and the UNFCCC, for example, one response to a claim 
under UNCLOS might be that the parties should agree to settle their disputes 
under the dispute settlement process in the UNFCCC.107 This is, however, a 
difficult position to defend because there are no binding obligations in the 
UNFCCC on individual States to take action to prevent harmful effects on the 
marine environment.108 Similarly, the Paris Agreement, which relies on the same 
dispute settlement process as the UNFCCC, does not impose obligations on 
parties to prevent harm to the marine environment.109 Thus, a claim that pollution 
originating from a given State causes harm to the marine environment is unlikely 
to be considered a dispute under the UNFCCC or the Paris Agreement. Even 
assuming an UNCLOS tribunal, such as ITLOS, ICJ, or an arbitral tribunal, 
found that a dispute could be established under the UNFCCC or the Paris 
Agreement, under Article 14 of the UNFCCC the parties have a non-mandatory 
option to agree on a binding dispute resolution process.110 
Moreover, a potential finding that there may be a breach of UNCLOS 
obligations through binding dispute settlement over a failure to mitigate the 
effects of climate change would raise a number of additional questions. Who can 
bring such a claim, and against what countries could such a claim be brought? 
What is the likelihood of such a claim? What would be the implications of such 
a claim for the climate change regime and international relations more generally? 
To what standard would a Party be held? 
Finally, there would be problems associated with possible remedies. Would 
remedies be limited to a finding that a Party was in violation of its obligations, 
or would they extend to an order to reduce pollution, either generally or by a 
specific amount? Furthermore, could remedies include an award of damages or 
perhaps even an order to assist other parties in adapting to climate change? 
 
 107.  Boom, supra note 13, at 224 (arguing that “there is clearly a conflict between the procedures 
provided in the climate regime and the LOSC. . . . Article 14 of the UNFCCC requires Parties to reach 
agreement as to what peaceful means of dispute resolution are to be utilised [sic]. In contrast, the LOSC 
provides compulsory binding dispute processes that can be utilised [sic] at the initiation of one Party 
only.”). 
 108.  See A. E. Boyle, Some Reflections on the Relationship of Treaties and Soft Law, 48 INT’L & 
COMP. L.Q. 901, 907 (1999) (arguing that the core articles of the UNFCCC are so “cautiously and 
obscurely” worded and “so weak” that it is uncertain whether any real obligation is created). 
 109.  Paris Agreement, supra note 2, at art. 24; UNFCCC, supra note 2, at art. 14 (“Settlement of 
Disputes”). 
 110.  UNFCCC, supra note 2, at art. 14 (“Settlement of Disputes”); Doelle, supra note 84, at 331. 
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IV.  IMPLICATIONS OF A REQUEST FOR AN ADVISORY OPINION AT THE 
INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE LAW OF SEA 
A.  Climate Change Litigation 
The idea of filing an action based on climate change damage is not entirely 
novel.111 In 2002, Tuvalu, a small island developing State in the South Pacific, 
announced that it intended to sue Australia and the United States before the ICJ 
over climate change.112 In 2011, the island State of Palau announced plans to 
seek an advisory opinion from the ICJ on the question of States’ legal 
responsibility to ensure activities within their territories that emit greenhouse 
gases do not harm other States.113 
Climate change litigation may take a variety of forms. At the domestic level, 
plaintiffs who could prove harm or injury suffered from climate change could 
bring actions in local courts against the government, file a claim against 
corporations whose conduct has a disproportionate impact on climate change, or 
bring a claim before an international tribunal.114 Despite the recognized link 
between the actions and failures of industrialized nations to regulate greenhouse 
gases and climate change, domestic suits are unlikely to succeed because of 
sovereign immunity.115 Furthermore, it could be argued that these emissions do 
not necessarily violate international law and that the reference to a right to a 
healthy environment in many international instruments does not create a legally 
cognizable right to be free from climate change.116 
B.  Request for Advisory Opinion 
The dispute settlement regime in UNCLOS is one of the most complex 
systems and one of only a few ever included in any global convention. It is 
considered a central pillar of the Convention and part of the delicate 
compromises included in the “package-deal” of negotiations that led to the 
 
 111.  See VERHEYEN, supra note 10, at 225‒332 (analyzing the legal duties that require states to 
prevent climate change damage and the extent to which a breach of these duties will give rise to state 
liability); see also Peel, supra note 10 (examining challenges for potential litigants across the broad 
spectrum of climate change litigation). 
 112.  Jacobs, supra note 10. 
 113.  Xing-Yin Ni, A Nation Going Under: Legal Protection for “Climate Change Refugees”, 38 
B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 329, 353 (2015). 
 114.  See, e.g., Esmeralda Colombo, Enforcing International Climate Change Law in Domestic 
Courts: A New Trend of Cases for Boosting Principle 10 of the Rio Declaration?, 35 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. 
& POL’Y 98, 108–09 (2017) (discussing the value of enforcement of international climate change law in 
domestic courts). 
 115.  See JANE MCADAM, CLIMATE CHANGE, FORCED MIGRATION, AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 92 
(2012); Eric A. Posner, Climate Change and International Human Rights Litigation: A Critical Appraisal, 
155 U. PA. L. REV. 1925, 1927 (2007). 
 116.  Posner, supra note 115, at 1930‒31; see also Susan Glazebrook, Human Rights and the 
Environment, 40 VICT. U. WELLINGTON L. REV. 293, 294‒95 (2009). 
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adoption of UNCLOS in 1982.117 Under the package deal, States agreed to 
accept the Convention in its entirety, with no right to make reservations,118 and 
that, as a general principle, all disputes concerning the interpretation or 
application of any provision in the Convention would be subject to compulsory 
binding dispute settlement.119 When States become parties to UNCLOS, they 
consent in advance to the system of compulsory binding dispute settlement in the 
Convention.120 
The dispute settlement system under UNCLOS is contained in Part XV of 
the Convention. The provisions of Part XV are only applicable when there is a 
“dispute” that relates to either the “interpretation” or “application” of the 
Convention.121 In addition to the dispute requirement, that dispute must also be 
“legal” or “justiciable” in that it must be capable of being settled by the 
application of principles and rules of international law.122 
If a settlement is not reached, UNCLOS stipulates that the dispute can be 
submitted, at the request of any party, to the dispute to a court or tribunal having 
jurisdiction.123 UNCLOS defines those courts or tribunals with jurisdiction as: 
(a) the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, established in accordance 
with Annex VI of the Convention, including the Seabed Disputes Chamber; (b) 
the ICJ; (c) an arbitral tribunal constituted in accordance with Annex VII of the 
Convention; and (d) a special arbitral tribunal constituted in accordance with 
Annex VIII for one or more of the categories of disputes specified therein.124 
 
 117.  A.O. ADEDE, THE SYSTEM FOR SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES UNDER THE UNITED NATIONS 
CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE SEA: A DRAFTING HISTORY AND A COMMENTARY 241 (1987). 
 118.  States may not make reservations unless expressly permitted by other articles of the 
Convention. UNCLOS, supra note 11, at art. 309. 
 119.  UNCLOS, supra note 11, at arts. 286–296. 
 120.  NATALIE KLEIN, DISPUTE SETTLEMENT IN THE UN CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE SEA 53 
(2005) (“No additional form of consent is required once a State is party to the Convention – consent to be 
bound by UNCLOS includes consent to compulsory procedures entailing binding decisions (subject to 
Sections 1 and 3 of Part XV). Under Section 2, the States in dispute do not need (both or all) to consent 
to the referral of the dispute to a court or tribunal, but the dispute can be submitted at the behest of just 
one of the disputant States.”). 
 121.  UNCLOS, supra note 11, at art. 286. 
 122.  Id. at art. 293 (stating that the court or tribunal with jurisdiction shall apply the Convention and 
“other rules of international law not incompatible with this Convention.”). Article 286 of UNCLOS 
provides the general rule that any dispute concerning the interpretation or application of any provision in 
the Convention, not settled by the parties, is subject to the system of compulsory binding dispute 
settlement in Section 2 of Part XV of UNCLOS. Id. at art. 286. This is, of course, subject to the limitations 
and exceptions to the applicability of Section 2 of Part XV as specified in Section 3 of Part XV. Id. at arts. 
297‒99 (Section 3 of Part XV). The parties to a dispute have the obligation to exchange views, under 
Article 283, and to exhaust local remedies where this is required by international law, under Article 295. 
Id. at arts. 283, 295. 
 123.  Id. at art. 286. 
 124.  Id. at art. 287. The availability of a variety of forums was a compromise to secure consensus 
during the negotiations for the compulsory dispute settlement provisions of UNCLOS. See Jonathan I. 
Charney, The Implications of Expanding International Dispute Settlement Systems: The 1982 Convention 
on the Law of the Sea, 90 AM. J. INT’L L. 69, 71 (1996). 
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Article 191 of UNCLOS provides the advisory jurisdiction of the Seabed 
Disputes Chamber, stating that the Chamber “shall give advisory opinions at the 
request of the Assembly or the Council on legal questions arising within the 
scope of their activities. Such opinions shall be given as a matter of urgency.”125 
The Rules of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea also authorize the 
Tribunal to give an advisory opinion on a legal question if the submission to the 
Tribunal is specifically provided for by “an international agreement related to the 
purposes of the Convention.”126 Nonetheless, the non-binding nature of the 
ruling of a Tribunal on other States under UNCLOS and its lack of precedential 
value on other States who are not parties to the dispute, minimizes the value of 
these mechanisms.127 
A claimant State may also have the option to seek an advisory opinion at 
the ICJ.128 The founding document provides that the ICJ “may give an advisory 
opinion on any legal question at the request of whatever body may be authorized 
by or in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations to make such a 
request.”129 A State could also request an ICJ advisory opinion through certain 
bodies of the United Nations.130 Furthermore, other United Nations organs and 
specialized agencies, when authorized by the General Assembly, may also 
request advisory opinions of the ICJ on legal questions arising within the scope 
of their activities.131 
C.  Challenges Posed by Climate Change Litigation 
At the international level, inter-state disputes and judicial adjudication 
involving States suing for climate change damage are not prevalent. There has 
been more progress pushing the limits of the law at the national level,132 
including a dramatic increase in the number of court cases at the national level 
involving climate change-related causes of action in the context of tort law, trade 
practices legislation, and action in administrative or constitutional law.133 In 
 
 125.  UNCLOS, supra note 11, at art. 191; see also International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, 
Rules of the Tribunal arts. 130‒37, ITLOS/8 (Mar. 17, 2009) [hereinafter Rules of the Tribunal]. 
 126.  Rules of the Tribunal, supra note 125, at art. 138, ¶ 1. Article 138(3) provides that Articles 130 
to 137 shall apply mutatis mutandis. Id. at art. 138, ¶ 3. 
 127.  UNCLOS, supra note 11, at art. 296. 
 128.  Daniel Bodansky, The Role of the International Court of Justice in Addressing Climate Change: 
Some Preliminary Reflections, 49 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 689, 711–12 (2017). 
 129.  Statute of the Court of the International Court of Justice art. 65, ¶ 1. 
 130.  Strauss, supra note 106, at 10,187. 
 131.  Jacobs, supra note 10, at 117. 
 132.  See Cameron Jefferies, Filling the Gaps in Canada’s Climate Change Strategy: All Litigation, 
All the Time, 38 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1371, 1395–1404 (2015) (documenting recent litigation using 
human rights strategies to push Canadian environmental policy); Brian J. Preston, The Influence of 
Climate Change Litigation on Governments and the Private Sector, 2 CLIMATE L. 485, 485–86, 509 
(2011). 
 133.  Brian J. Preston, Climate Change Litigation (Part 2), 5 CARBON & CLIMATE L. REV. 244, 244, 
256 (2011); see also Nicola Durrant, Tortious Liability for Greenhouse Gas Emissions? Climate Change, 
LEE AND BAUTISTA ELQ 45.1 FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 9/9/18  9:12 AM 
2018] MAKING OUT A CLIMATE CHANGE CLAIM 153 
 
some countries, such as Australia and the United States, climate change cases 
have been filed in state courts and administrative tribunals, relying on existing 
legislation to compel government decision makers to consider the risks 
associated with climate change in their planning processes.134 
There is a convincing case that failure to mitigate climate change falls under 
the definition of pollution of the marine environment under UNCLOS, which can 
be considered a violation of the obligations of States parties under UNCLOS to 
protect and preserve the marine environment. However, no such claim or case 
has been submitted for adjudication in any international forum.135 There are a 
number of critical hurdles that need to be surmounted first. These hurdles include 
the question of establishing standing to sue, the attribution of acts of private 
corporations and individuals to a State, the questions of legal and factual 
causation for climate change damage, the question of allocation of responsibility 
for multiple wrongdoers, the possibility of raising valid defenses which may 
preclude liability, and the suite of available remedies to redress and compensate 
the damages sustained by a claimant State for climate change damages.136 
The dispute settlement mechanism within the framework of UNCLOS 
clearly creates an obligation among States to settle their claims peacefully by any 
means of their own choice.137 However, the principle of peaceful settlement of 
international disputes operates on the basis of the sovereign equality of States.138 
The compulsory settlement mechanism within the framework of UNCLOS is 
triggered only as an option where the parties are not able to settle their 
differences by peaceful means of their choice.139 But, even then, the submission 
of a dispute to such a forum depends on the willingness of the parties.140 As such, 
 
Causation and Public Policy Considerations, 7 QUEENSL. U. TECH. L. & JUST. J. 403, 405 (2007) 
(assessing the legal principles associated with potential negligence claims against industrial emitters in 
Australia for harms from climate change). 
 134.  Jacqueline Peel & Hari M. Osofsky, Climate Change Litigation’s Regulatory Pathways: A 
Comparative Analysis of the United States and Australia, 35 LAW & POL’Y 150, 156 (2013). 
 135.  See Doelle, supra note 84, at 324 (“The substance of Part XII [of UNCLOS] has not been 
interpreted by any international tribunal.”). 
 136.  Boom, supra note 13, at 229. 
 137.  UNCLOS, supra note 11 at art. 280; A.O. Adede, Prolegomena to the Disputes Settlement Part 
of the Law of the Sea Convention, 10 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 253, 257 (1977); Lowell Bautista, Dispute 
Settlement in the Law of the Sea Convention and Territorial and Maritime Disputes in Southeast Asia: 
Issues, Opportunities, and Challenges, 6 ASIAN POL. & POL’Y 375, 378‒82 (2014); Howard S. Schiffman, 
The Dispute Settlement Mechanism of UNCLOS: A Potentially Important Framework for Marine Wildlife 
Management, 1 J. INT’L WILDLIFE L. & POL’Y 293, 296‒97 (1998); Louis B. Sohn, Settlement of Disputes 
Arising Out of the Law of the Sea Convention, 12 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 495, 497‒500 (1975). 
 138.  See Ted L. McDorman, Global Ocean Governance and International Adjudicative Dispute 
Resolution, 43 OCEAN & COASTAL MGMT. 255, 258–59 (2000) (asserting that the dispute settlement 
procedure of UNCLOS is not part of customary law and, thus, are only binding upon those states which 
are parties to UNCLOS). 
 139.  UNCLOS, supra note 11, at art. 286. 
 140.  In this regard, the dispute resolution mechanism may appear to offer no progress over previous 
regimes. This is actually not the case. In international law there is really no judicial forum with compulsory 
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the settlement process is only as good as the claimant States are willing to 
formally invoke it. 
CONCLUSION 
There is a growing recognition of the importance of ocean environmental 
protection in international jurisprudence.141 One of the most significant recent 
examples is the South China Sea arbitration decision.142 Despite this, however, 
State practice still shows serious gaps in adopting this trend. In particular, current 
research on State practice of national and regional marine pollution contingency 
planning in Asia-Pacific reveals that there has been little regard displayed in the 
region for accommodating a proactive approach to marine environmental 
protection. 
The international community is attempting to tackle the problem of climate 
change and to find ways to mitigate the damages associated with it, and this is 
particularly true in States suffering the consequences of climate change and sea-
level rise.143 One suggestion has been to bring a legal claim before an 
international tribunal to commence climate change litigation. From the 
perspective of the current regime of international law, including the Law of the 
Sea and State responsibility, the feasibility and effectiveness of such climate 
change litigation is highly questionable. This is largely based on the problem of 
establishing causation and other related issues. An alternative suggestion is to 
use the legal mechanism of UNCLOS, not to have an adjudication of the issue, 
but to seek the issuance of an advisory opinion on the legal question presented 
by climate change in light of international agreements related to the purposes of 
UNCLOS. The problem with such an advisory opinion, however, would be its 
effectiveness due to its non-binding character. 
 
jurisdiction. Any form of third-party dispute resolution is founded upon the assent of the parties involved. 
The lack of compulsion to submit to judicial forums under UNCLOS is neither a serious drawback nor 
does it fall short of legitimate expectations. The UNCLOS dispute settlement regime improves upon the 
Optional Protocol system in the sense that, in the case of the former, States become automatically bound 
by the compulsory procedures upon ratification of the UNCLOS, whereas under the latter, States become 
bound only when they become parties to the Protocol. 
 141.  See, e.g., Yoshifumi Tanaka, Provisional Measures Prescribed by ITLOS and Marine 
Environmental Protection, 108 PROC. ANN. MEETING (AM. SOC’Y INT’L L.) 365 (2014) (discussing the 
use of provisional measures by ITLOS in marine environmental protection); David L. VanderZwaag, The 
ICJ, ITLOS and the Precautionary Approach: Paltry Progressions, Jurisprudential Jousting, 35 U. HAW. 
L. REV. 617, 623‒25 (2013) (discussing the importance of marine pollution cases in developing the 
precautionary principle). At the ITLOS, cases which had aspects of marine environmental protection 
include: The MOX Plant Case, supra note 57; Straits of Johor Case, supra note 57; Southern Bluefin Tuna 
Cases, supra note 40. 
 142.  The South China Sea Arbitration Award of July 12, 2016, supra note 22, ¶¶ 906‒11, 925‒38. 
 143.  See, e.g., Lowell Bautista, Legal and Policy Responses to Climate Change in the Philippines, 
in CLIMATE CHANGE IMPACTS ON OCEAN AND COASTAL LAW: U.S. AND INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES 
647, 648–63 (Randall S. Abate ed., 2015) (examining the impacts of climate change in the Philippines and 
how to effectively implement national policies to mitigate these impacts). 
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An effective and equitable response to climate change involves a 
commitment from the international community to put in place adequate and 
sustainable funding arrangements towards climate change mitigation and 
adaptation, technology transfer, and capacity building.144 The global goal of 
climate change adaptation should be to enhance adaptive capacity, strengthen 
resilience, and reduce vulnerability of States to climate change.145 
In conclusion, there is no single solution to resolve the issue of climate 
change, but a better understanding of the linkages between Parties’ obligations 
under relevant treaties such as the UNFCCC, the Paris Agreement, and 
UNCLOS, among others, may provide further impetus for States to take climate 
change seriously and increase their efforts to negotiate additional agreements and 
implement them effectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 144.  Burleson, supra note 1, at 549‒50. For instance, the Copenhagen Accord provides that the 
Green Climate Fund will facilitate developed countries in providing “adequate, predictable and sustainable 
financial resources, technology and capacity-building to support the implementation of adaptation action 
in developing countries.” United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Report of the 
Conference of the Parties on Its Fifteenth Session, Held in Copenhagen from 7 to 19 December 2009, at 
6, ¶ 3, U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/2009/11/Add.1 (Mar. 30, 2010). 
 145.  Paris Agreement, supra note 2, at arts. 7, 11. 
 
We welcome responses to this Article. If you are interested in submitting a response for our online 
journal, Ecology Law Currents, please contact cse.elq@law.berkeley.edu. Responses to articles 
may be viewed at our website, hrrp://www.ecologylawquarterly.org. 
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